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Abstract 
This study used a sample (N = 68) of regular coffee drinkers to investigate 
how cravings may influence JOLs when completing a cue-only word pair task. Two 
groups: a craving and a control group were randomly allocated where cravers had to 
avoid consuming coffee before testing. Both groups completed a word pair encoding 
task followed by completing either a craving induction task if they had abstained 
from coffee or a control task if they had not. Both groups then made cue-only JOLs 
and a subsequent retrieval attempt on the target. Craving strength was measured at 
the end of the experiment. Results indicated that JOLs for cravers were less realistic 
which may have been due to the presence of cravings.  
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Kemps and Tiggemann, (2010) define cravings as the intense motivation to 
obtain, ingest, or consume a substance. We adopt this definition: conceptualising 
cravings as a state of motivation. Cravings for various substances (e.g., tobacco, 
alcohol and chocolate, have been found to impair cognition (Heckman  et al., 2013; 
Kemps & Tiggemann, 2009a; 2009b; Sinha et al., 2009; Smeets, Roefs, & Jansen, 
2009; Tiggemann, Kemps, & Parnell, 2010; Uva et al., 2010; Zuj, Palmer & Kemps, 
2015). As cravings consume cognitive resources, fewer resources are available for 
other important cognitive tasks (May, Andrade, Kavanagh, 2012; May, Andrade, 
Panabokke, & Kavanagh, 2004; Sayette & Hufford, 1994). The effects of cravings 
on cognition include deficits in working memory, memory, attention, visual 
processing, motivational salience (Bonson et al., 2002; Field, Munafo, & Franken, 
2009; Meule, Skirde, Freund, Vogele, & Kubler, 2012; Naim-Feil, Fitzgerald, 
Bradshaw, Lubman, & Sheppard, 2014; Steel, Kemps, & Tiggemann, 2006).  
We aimed to replicate the effect of coffee cravings on cognition and to look 
at whether cravings also affect metacognition. Metacognition can be defined as an 
individual’s knowledge of how their own cognitive and memory processes function 
(Koriat, 2007). Theories such as Koriat’s (1997) cue-utilisation hypothesis predict 
that cravings will impair metacognition due to metacognition’s reliance on cues. We 
extend this research into higher order metacognitive judgements by investigating if 
and how metacognitive processes such as Judgements of Learning (JOLs) and 
Feeling of Knowing (FOKs) are affected by in vivo craving exposure via the use of 
coffee and a related imagery task. Doing so may provide insight into how 
metacognitive judgements function and whether they are largely deliberatively and 
analytically formed or automatic and heuristic driven (Metcalfe & Finn, 2008).  
How are cravings measured? 
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Cravings have generally been measured via visual analogue scales (VAS) 
measuring craving intensity (Kemps & Tiggemann, 2009a; Townsend & Heit, 2011). 
This requires a participant to view a scale that ranges from ‘no desire or urge to 
consume coffee’ to an ‘extremely strong desire or urge to consume coffee (Kemp, 
2009b). To avoid alerting participants that their cravings were of interest, VAS 
measures are usually collected after the dependent measures have been collected 
(Kemps & Tiggemann, 2009b). The VAS functions via self-report which is not 
impervious to criticism, but due to the nature of cravings (i.e., a subjective 
motivational state) one could argue for its utility (Green, Rogers, Elliman, 2000). 
While there are other options the research within smoking and food indicates that a 
VAS is a simple, cost effective, and valid measurement instrument (Kemps & 
Tiggemann, 2009b; Zuj, Palmer, & Kemps, 2015). 
How do cravings work? 
Theoretical perspectives on substance dependence can help elucidate the 
mechanisms underlying cravings. Cravings research has largely followed the 
direction of substance use disorders such as alcohol dependence (Kavanagh, D, May, 
& Andrade, 2009; Ramirez, Monti, & Colwill, 2014). According to Koob and 
LeMoal, (2001) drug taking results in two processes occurring: (1) the drug elicits a 
pleasurable effect upon the individual; (2) a compensatory effect occurs in which the 
individual returns to homeostasis. The authors note that with continued use the 
pleasurable effects of the drug are less pronounced due to increased tolerance and 
this increased tolerance results in an inability to return the individual to the normal 
range of reward functioning. It is at this point that withdrawal symptoms occur as the 
result from reward mechanisms being poorly regulated in the brain (Robinson & 
Berridge, 2008). Robinson and Berridge’s, (1993) incentive salience theory of 
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addiction suggests that during continued exposure to drug–taking a Pavlovian 
conditioned response occurs. After frequent drug-taking, cues become enmeshed 
with the taking of a drug leading to drug and drug cue saliency which proceeds to 
create cravings related to obtaining the drug in question. Thus, drug cues can 
function as a conditioned reinforcer leading to possible drug taking and associated 
behaviours (Robinson & Berridge, 1993). This process has been termed Pavlovian-
instrumental transfer and while relating largely to elicit substances the argument 
could also be applied to licit substances such as coffee (Dickinson, Smith, & 
Mirenowicz 2000; Kemps 2009b).  
Pavlovian-instrumental transfer is typically tested using the cue-reactivity 
paradigm (Dickinson, Smith, & Mirenowicz, 2000). The paradigm exposes 
substance abuse sufferers to cues that are related to the process of taking drugs (e.g., 
related situations or environments, and paraphernalia such as needles). Cue-
reactivity has been studied in various samples (e.g., alcoholics, smokers, and heroin 
and cocaine addicts) and using varied cue presentation methods e.g., photographs of 
cues, imagery and in vivo exposure (Carter & Tiffany, 1999; Kemps, & Tiggemann, 
2015; Tiffany & Drobes, 1990). Cue-reactivity is commonly measured via self-
report, although physical measures are possible (Tiffany, Carter, & Singleton, 2000). 
The same cue-reactivity paradigm will be employed in the current study looking at 
coffee cravings with the use of craving strength self-report measures and imagery 
and in vivo exposures to coffee. The justification for this method comes largely from 
Kemps (2009b). 
Recently, researchers have begun using fMRI paradigms to (1) identify brain 
regions involved in cravings and addiction and; (2) test pre-existing theories of 
addiction and inform new theories of addiction and cravings (Engelmann et al., 
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2012). The use of fMRI techniques has largely been focussed upon the neural 
substrates of smoking cue reactivity according to Engelmann et al., (2012). But the 
findings may be applied to substances typified by high levels of dependency in order 
to inform general theory and identify differences between substances and substance 
specific cues according to the author. 
 Engelmann’s et al., (2012) meta-analysis looked at the neural substrates of 
cue reactivity in deprived and non-deprived smokers indicated that in deprived 
smokers, several areas of the brain largely within the extended visual system showed 
higher activation levels in response to smoking cues. Engelmann et al., (2012) 
suggests this may be due to increased allocation of attentional resources as the 
smoking cues are arousing for deprived smokers. Researchers looking at attention 
via the presentation of emotional stimuli and neutral stimuli have found that large 
areas of the extended visual system elicit larger responses to the emotional stimuli 
compared to the neutral stimuli (Bradley et al., 2003; Lang et al., 1998; Sabatinelli, 
Lang, Keil, & Bradley, 2007) supporting Engelmann et al., (2012) claim. This leads 
one to consider that substance related cues may reduce the attentional resources 
allocated to an associated cognitive task if the person is experiencing cravings 
(Kemps & Tiggemann, 2009b; Zuj, Palmer, & Kemps, 2015)   
Engelmann et al., (2012) suggest that additional resources may be shifted to 
smoking cues when smokers have had a period of abstinence due to a region in the 
lingual gyrus consistently being activated more in those who abstained compared to 
those who did not. This hypothesised explanation does have some credence 
especially considering Robinson and Berridge’s (2003) argument that long term drug 
abuse may result in drug cues being attributed with incentive salience, which may be 
even more likely when sufferers are in periods of abstinence (Drummond, 2000). 
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This may result in a perceptual bias towards smoking valence cues which has also 
been found in other domains such as food related cues (Calitri, Pothos, Tapper, 
Brunstrom, & Rogers, 2010; Koob & LeMoal, 2001; Robinson & Berridge, 2008). 
Why do cravings lead to a decrease in cognitive task performance? 
Studies investigating cravings have largely revolved around alcohol, 
smoking, and food (including coffee), via the use of in vivo exposure and imagery 
tasks (Green, Rogers, & Elliman, 2000; Harvey, Kemps, & Tiggemann, 2005; 
Kemps & Tiggemannn, 2009a; 2009b; Sinha et al., 2009; Tiffany & Hakenewerth, 
1991). These studies generally demonstrate that cravings result in decreased 
performance on a cognitive task (e.g., reaction time or working memory capacity 
tasks) (Zuj, Palmer, & Kemps, 2015; Zwaan, Stanfield, & Madden, 2000). This is 
due to cravings consuming finite cognitive resources resulting in fewer being 
available for other cognitive tasks (Kemps & Tiggemann, 2009b). Expanding this 
further, when cravings occur subsequent action schemas are triggered (i.e., automatic 
behavioural patterns which aim to satisfy the craving such as purchasing cigarettes or 
going to a café to buy a coffee) and because these action schemas are implemented 
automatically, few cognitive resources are required for them to be performed - 
however, resources are required to suppress them (Tiffany, 1990). 
Via the use of a cognitive-experimental paradigm evidence suggests that 
imagery can elevate food craving (Kemps & Tiggemann, 2010). Kemps, Tiggemann, 
and Grigg, (2008) used an induction task in which participants were experimentally 
induced via exposing participants to chocolate after abstaining from consuming 
chocolate for 24 hours. The results indicated that cravers demonstrated working 
memory deficits (the ability to store information while processing other information) 
and slower reaction times in an operation-span task where participants were tasked 
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with remembering a set of words in addition to also solving mathematical problems 
(Kemps, Tiggeman, & Grigg, 2008). The authors attributed this to habitual cravers 
allocating limited cognitive resources to cues that were associated to cravings which 
reduced their performance on a cognitive task. While action schemas are 
implemented automatically, this result adds support to the notion that cognitive 
resources are required to suppress craving action schemas (Tiffany, 1990).  
Why should we be concerned? 
The influence of cravings may significantly impair one’s ability to maintain 
professional standards, accuracy in work may fall due to reduced attention, or 
information may be forgotten. One may argue that due to coffee being a socially 
accepted substance the concern should not be as great compared to an illicit 
substance such as heroin, but the fact that coffee cravings have been found to reduce 
performance indicates that the severity and the ability of coffee cravings to influence 
cognitive performance should not be underestimated (Kemps & Tiggemann, 2009b).  
What is metacognition? 
 Koriat (2007) broadly defines metacognition as an individual’s knowledge as 
to how their own cognitive and memory processes function. Simply put, 
metacognition provides one with privileged access to their own mind and allows one 
to critically evaluate, monitor, and control what they learn, how they learn it, and 
how they can recall or recognise that information effectively (Nelson & Narens, 
1990). Metacognition can be viewed as a purely individualistic reference and 
feedback provider of how an individual thinks about their own ability to think and 
learn. 
Metacognitive research has largely followed two paths: memory research and 
developmental psychology. Within the developmental research paradigm the 
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assumption is that metacognition and its associated processes are fundamental in 
learning and memory development (Dunlosky & Metcalfe, 2009; Koriat, 2007). 
Research in the developmental paradigm has aimed to track metacognitive 
development and see how metacognition influences cognition (Koriat 2007).Within 
the domain of memory research, the focus has been on investigating the mechanisms 
that allow individuals to monitor their own knowledge, and whether self-monitoring 
affects how individuals learn content (Dunlosky & Metcalfe, 2009; Koriat, 2007; 
Son & Metcalfe, 2005).  
Research in the memory paradigm has stemmed from studies investigating 
feeling-of-knowing (FOK; Hart, 1965) i.e., the feeling that a person knows the 
answer to a question but it unable to access it directly, and studies looking at the tip-
of-the-tongue phenomena (TOT; Brown & McNeill, 1966) i.e., a feeling that 
accurate retrieval is imminent due to partial recall of the item after failing to retrieve 
an item. These were the first studies to look at metacognition from a memory process 
view point (Koriat 2007). While both of these paths have inherent utility, the current 
study aims to discover whether these judgements are based purely on memorial 
retrieval or on the utilisation of cues. 
How is metacognition measured? 
While a myriad of metacognitive judgement paradigms have been used 
experimentally, the two judgements with the most research backing are JOLs and 
FOKs (Koriat, 2007; Dunlosky & Metcalfe, 2009). The current study will focus on 
JOLs, specifically delayed JOLs (Nelson & Dunlosky, 1991). Metacognitive 
measurement taps into the extent in which metacognitive judgements can predict 
performance on a future-orientated cognitive task (Dunlosky, Serra, & Baker, 2007). 
This has largely been measured by coefficients such as Goodman-Kruskal’s (1954) 
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gamma (G), Adjusted Normalised Residual Index (ANRI), Over/Under confidence 
(O/U) and Calibration coefficients (C). See the results section for a description of 
ANRI, O/U, and Calibration. Goodman-Kruskal’s (1954) gamma has largely been 
used to assess confidence-accuracy correlations. The problem with gamma is that it 
can be affected by metacognitive bias according to Fleming and Lau, (2014). For 
example, gamma can be influenced by one’s tendency in whether they report high or 
low confidence overall (Masson & Rotello, 2009). This indicates that gamma can be 
influenced by variables outside of metacognition such as individual personality 
factors (Fleming & Lau, 2014; Yaniv, Yates, & Smith, 1991). The use of ANRI aims 
to remove the bias in determining one’s discrimination ability resulting in a more 
impermeable measure of discrimination (Fleming & Lau, 2014). 
JOLs. JOLs can be defined as a judgement made by an individual regarding 
the likelihood of remembering items studied recently on a future test (Dunlosky, 
Serra, & Baker, 2007). JOLs can be split into different categories but within the 
current study paired-associate judgements will be used. Paired associate judgements 
differ from other categories in that JOLs are made during the study of cue-target 
word pairs and incorporate a prediction on future memory performance (Schwartz, 
1994).  Within paired associate judgements one can use a cue-only JOL where the 
cue word is shown to the participant and they must estimate how likely they would 
be to recall the target word (Metcalfe & Dunlosky, 2008). One can also use a cue-
target JOL whereby the participant is presented with the cue and target word and 
must estimate how likely they would be to recall the to-be target word in the future. 
Once JOLs are made participants are asked to enter the target words for all word 
pairs if they are able. This allows researchers to compare recall ability (i.e., could 
participants recall the right target words that matched the associated cue words) and 
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JOL accuracy which compares one’s JOL estimate to their average recall percentage 
(Dunlosky & Metcalfe, 2009; Koriat, 1997; 2006).  
Delayed JOLs. Nelson and Dunlosky, (1991) found that JOLs that were 
made after a small time delay after stimuli were studied resulted in an increased 
ability in delineating between items that were learned well and items that were not 
learned well. When a cue-target JOL was made the accuracy of the JOL was 
significantly lower than cue-only JOL accuracy (Dunlosky & Nelson, 1992).  
Three main theories have been put forward to explain delayed JOLs. Firstly, 
the monitoring dual memories hypothesis (Nelson & Dunlosky, 1991) which states 
that immediate JOLs are based on retrieval from short and long term memory 
(Metcalfe & Finn, 2008). Due to the judgement occurring almost immediately, the 
authors suggest that the target will only be in STM and a retrieval attempt via LTM 
will not occur resulting in poor discrimination. Conversely delayed JOLs rely purely 
on LTM retrieval which the authors note as having greater predictive utility. 
Secondly, the transfer appropriate processing view (Begg, Duft, Lalonde, Melnick, 
& Sanvito, 1989) states that delayed JOLs utilise retrieval that is more similar to 
what may be used at testing compared to immediate JOLs. Finally, the self-fulfilling 
prophecy (Kimball & Metcalfe, 2003) suggests that the increase in delayed JOL 
accuracy is due to JOLs themselves enhancing memory due to the utilisation of 
retrieval. From these theories the process of retrieval is a key and fundamental 
component in terms of explaining the delayed JOL effect (Son & Metcalfe, 2005; 
Metcalfe & Finn, 2008). 
Why is metacognition important? 
 Studying metacognition is important in terms of education (enhancing one’s 
ability to monitor task choice and outcome); organisational settings (judging one’s 
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own actual level of task confidence compared to perceived confidence); forensic 
settings (eyewitness testimony confidence and memory malleability). From an 
educational setting metacognition is important as it requires one to reflect upon 
individual performance strengths and weaknesses and strategies for learning. This 
enables individuals to identify areas in which they may need additional resources or 
areas in which they are competent highlighting metacognition’s importance, not just 
in terms of education but in all aspects of daily living (Metcalfe & Dunlosky, 2008). 
How does metacognition work? 
 It is important to draw attention to the metacognitive processes of monitoring 
and control as these are fundamental constructs in understanding how metacognition 
functions (Flavell, 1979; Nelson & Narens, 1990). The framework depicted by 
Nelson and Narens, (1990) postulates that cognitive processes may be split into those 
that occur at the object level (i.e., encoding and retrieval) and those that occur at the 
meta level such as monitoring (i.e., monitoring basic cognitive processes such as 
encoding or comprehension) and control (i.e., modifying object level functions such 
as incorporating rehearsal if content is hard to recall) (Koriat, 2007).  
 Monitoring allows an individual to observe and experience their own 
cognitive processes, whereas control takes the form of decisions made largely on the 
basis of these monitoring processes (Nelson & Narens, 1990). An example of 
metacognitive monitoring would be when students subjectively and consciously 
assess how well they know course content, whereas metacognitive control would be 
when a student has an exam and differentially allocates study time based on 
perceived strengths and weaknesses (Dunlosky, Serra, & Baker, 2007; Finley, Tullis, 
& Benjamin, 2010). Koriat, (2006) acknowledges that a common assumption within 
metacognitive research is that metacognitive control is shaped by the overarching 
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and guiding nature of metacognitive monitoring. Thus, to effectively manage one’s 
own learning, one must first be able to effectively monitor their knowledge and 
understanding to highlight areas that may need additional resources (Ackerman & 
Goldsmith, 2011; Ariel, Dunlosky, & Bailey, 2009; Thiede & Dunlosky, 1999; 
Tullis & Benjamin, 2011). 
Koriat’s (1997) Cue Utilisation hypothesis  
Koriat’s (1997) cue-utilisation hypothesis suggests that JOLs are similar to 
FOK judgements as both are largely inferential and based on an implicit application 
of heuristics while attempting to obtain an accurate idea of how likely information is 
to be recalled time. Koriat (1997) argues that JOLs do not depend on a person 
directly accessing and monitoring the strength of a memory trace (i.e., encoding 
strength), but rather on the use of cues which are generally predictive of memory 
performance. For example, JOLs depend more on heuristics such as how familiar a 
cue is compared to how strongly the target was encoded. 
It is important to note that due to being based on inferences and heuristics, 
JOL accuracy will not always be high (Metcalfe & Dunlosky, 2008). The predictive 
value of JOLs will vary depending on the inferences and heuristics discussed by 
Koriat, (1997). Koriat (1997) differentiates three types of cues: (1) intrinsic; (2) 
extrinsic and; (3) mnemonic cues. Intrinsic cues include characteristics of to-be-
studied items which the individual believes may signify the item’s ease of learning 
or difficulty in learning such as item relatedness. Extrinsic cues include 
characteristics of the learning condition such as how many times the item was 
presented or how long the items were studied for (e.g., I would be more likely to 
recall items that were presented more than others) (Koriat, 1997). Extrinsic cues also 
include how an individual encoded cue information such as an item’s level of 
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processing by the individual and if/how they used imagery when encoding (e.g., in 
seeing coke-can, participants may encode the cue as being related to the target 
resulting in participants believing that the target will be recalled easier) (Koriat, 
1997). Koriat (1997) notes that intrinsic and extrinsic cues may influence also 
indirectly influence JOLs via their influence on mnemonic cues.  
Mnemonic cues are defined as internal indicators which indicate the extent to 
which an item is learned (Koriat, 1997; 2006). Examples of mnemonic cues include 
familiarity of the cue word, encoding fluency, and the accessibility level of related 
information. For example, participants view the word pair of ghost-cart, this results 
in an internal feeling that ghost is already readily learned due to being exposed to 
that cue word more than others outside of the experiment. This may result in ghost 
being more familiar to the participant, possibly influencing how likely the target will 
be recalled (Dunlosky, Serra, & Baker, 2007). 
Theoretical models of metacognition 
Sitting beneath the cue-utilisation hypothesis two differing opinions exist in 
how these cues function. In terms of if cravings would affect JOLs the experience-
based view would suggest that JOLs would be influenced whereas the theory-based 
view would suggest that cravings would not influence JOLs.  Theory-based JOLs 
differ from experience-based JOLs in that theory-based JOLs rely largely upon 
beliefs and theories which inform JOLs. In this instance JOLs depend on aspects of 
the study material such as item-relatedness (intrinsic cues) or on what the conditions 
of learning may be such as if items are presented more than once (extrinsic cues). An 
example, would be that a person theorises that accurate word-pair recall should 
increase if word pairs are related (e.g. dog-cat) or if they get to see dog-cat more than 
once. How does this then relate to cravings? Theory-based JOLs, due to relying on a 
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priori beliefs would then be assumed to be unaffected by cravings as what is argued 
to determine JOLs in this context is how one applies preconceived ideas and 
theories. Thus, while cravings may reduce cognition resources to encoding, a person 
would apply their own modelling in determining what could be recalled and what 
may not be based upon their own ideas and conditions of the experiment. Examples 
of theories that utilise the theory-based approach include: (1) the monitoring-dual-
memories hypothesis (Nelson & Dunlosky, 1991); (2) the transfer-appropriate 
monitoring hypothesis (Begg, Duft, Lalonde, Melnick, & Sanvito, 1989); (3) the 
self-fulfilling prophecy hypothesis (Spellman & Bjork, 1992; Kimball & Metcalfe, 
2003) and; (4) the stochastic drift model (Sikstron & Jonsson, 2005).  
Conversely, Experience-based JOLs are said to be largely based upon 
mnemonic cues which give rise to on-line task performance (Koriat, 1997). Simply 
put mnemonic cues inform metacognitive judgements such as JOLs via heuristics 
which function below one’s consciousness. JOLs, using heuristics such as encoding 
fluency or ease of retrieval would inform how likely target words would be recalled 
in terms of the present study. Due to cravings reducing cognitive resources in these 
areas (e.g., working memory) cravings would be expected to constrain mnemonic 
cues, thus denigrating JOL accuracy. Furthermore, if these heuristics operate below 
consciousness one would not be able to critically evaluate the accuracy of these 
mnemonic cues (i.e., a person would not be able to correct their JOLs) so it may also 
result in a further denigration of performance because a person may use mnemonic 
cues that are inaccurate. A theory that utilises aspects of the experience-based 
approach include Son and Metcalfe’s, (2005) delayed JOL mode. The authors argue 
that delayed JOLs contain two processes: (1) a pre-retrieval stage suggested to be 
based on cue familiarity and; (2) a stage in which judgements are based on the 
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fluency of retrieval or another aspect of the target such as associated cues which one 
may only be aware of once retrieval has been attempted. This indicates that JOL 
accuracy should largely be determined via the presence of mnemonic cues.  
One key difference within this theory is that the authors suggest that the 
mnemonic cue of cue familiarity may be separate from other mnemonic cues in that 
it may originate not from an attempt at retrieval but from a stage prior to retrieval 
matching a similar theoretical perspective regarding FOKs (Koriat, 1993; 1995; Son 
& Metcalfe, 2005). Koriat’s (1993) accessibility hypothesis suggests that FOKs 
function as a by-product of the retrieval process where the goal is to identify a target. 
When delayed JOLs and cue-only JOLs are used, it appears that JOLs, like FOKs, 
function as a by-product of the attempted retrieval process i.e., the outcome of the 
retrieval process acts as heuristic to infer the strength of a target, (Koriat, 1993). As 
such these judgements are then largely based upon the quantity of information that is 
retrieved about the target and most importantly – irrespective of whether that 
information is accurate (Koriat, 1993). This draws parallels with the idea that 
manipulations that affect retrieval then should also affect JOLs as JOLs are based 
upon the by-products of the retrieval process (Metcalfe & Finn, 2008). Son and 
Metcalfe, (2005) suggest that JOLs like FOKs may then be based upon an evaluation 
of available cues which are available before the retrieval process and a fast 
preliminary assessment phase which can explain fast low JOLs (i.e., I do not know). 
Summary 
The aim of this study was to use a sample of regular coffee drinkers to 
investigate how cravings may influence JOL judgements when completing a cue-
only word pair task. Koriat’s (1997) cue-utilisation theory of JOLs attests that the 
JOL itself is largely automatic but that is influenced by cues which are heuristically 
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driven (i.e., not automatic and requiring attention). While we may not be able to 
directly influence the JOL through craving induction the assumption might be that 
we are able to indirectly influence JOLs by reducing the capacity of the individual to 
use cues to inform the judgement as the required resources are utilized in attending 
to the craving.  
The proposed study has two hypotheses: (1) those in the craving group who 
have abstained from drinking coffee on the day of testing will report significantly 
higher craving strength ratings as measured by the VAS on all four time points 
compared to controls; (2) that cravers will accurately recall significantly less target 
words than controls overall. The proposed study also aims to explore the nature of 
JOLs. If JOLs function predominately via long term memorial retrieval ability one 
would expect that JOL accuracy, as measured by calibration, over/under confidence, 
and resolution would not significantly differ to controls. Conversely, if JOLs 
function predominately via the utilisation of cues and heuristics which may suffer 
from reduced accuracy due to cravings, one would expect that JOL accuracy would 
be significantly lower for cravers as measured by calibration, over/under confidence 
and resolution. 
Method 
Participants 
Participant characteristics. Sixty-seven participants participated in the 
study, of which 23 were male, 42 were female and two indicated their sex as ‘other’. 
Ages ranged from 18 to 69 years (controls: M = 26.34, SD = 8.20; cravers: M = 
31.30, SD = 13.83). The sample contained 29 participants from the general Hobart 
area of Tasmania and 38 participants from the general Bedford Park area of South 
Australia (See Appendix A for ethics approval).  
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Sampling procedures. Stratified sampling was used in which eligibility 
criteria required prospective participants to consume coffee a minimum of once per 
day and to enjoy the taste of coffee (i.e., coffee consumption was due to a desire to 
consume coffee and not to secondary effects of caffeine such as mental alertness). 
Twenty-nine participants were tested at University of Tasmania (UTAS) and 38 
participants were tested at Flinders University. This took place in two rooms: one 
where participants engaged in a customised computer program and another used to 
invoke cravings. Participants received a $20 Coles/Myer gift card for participating or 
90 minutes course credit if they were a first year psychology student.  
Power.  The intended sample size for this study was between 80 and 120 
participants. A Cohen’s d of .50 would equate to power of .80 requiring 128 
participants with 64 in each condition according to G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, 
& Buchner, 2007).With 67 total participants (32 controls and 35 experimentals) and 
holding Cohen’s d at .5 power dropped to .52. 
Materials and Procedure 
 Allocation. Those who met the selection criteria were allocated to either the 
control the craving group based on the condition of the session in which they were 
able to attend. An excel spreadsheet, using =RANDBETWEEN 1,2 was used to 
randomly allocate sessions. Pure random allocation was not possible due to room 
constraints in that testing often included more than one individual at a time which 
may have resulted in participants being aware of what the other group was doing 
thus possibly influencing the results. Participants were then informed whether they 
had to abstain from coffee on the day of testing (see Appendix B) or continue ad 
libitum (see Appendix C), matching Kemps and Tiggemann’s, (2009b) protocol. 
Groups were tested separately so the control group could not smell coffee. 
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Information and consent. On arrival participants were given an information 
form regarding what was being investigated. Two versions of this form were used so 
as those in the control group were not aware of the experimental group’s requirement 
to abstain from coffee (see Appendix D & E). Participants also completed a consent 
form (see Appendix F).  
 Descriptive information. Participants completed a descriptive information 
form (see Appendix G). This form contained six questions regarding: (1) sex; (2) 
age; (3) what was their average coffee consumption per day on average in servings; 
(4) had they consumed any other caffeinated substances in the last 24 hours; (5) how 
many hours had passed since they last ingested coffee and; (6) were they a first year 
psychology student. The purpose of these questions was to obtain as much 
information about participants coffee consumption as possible so as to identify 
possible confounds such as whether the amount of coffee abstinence between 
controls and cravers was sufficient (Kemps & Tiggemann, 2009a; 2009b).   
 Program. A customised E-Prime (Psychology Software Tools, 2012) 
program was used in this study which consisted of four phases. Firstly participants 
were presented with 100 non-sensical noun cue-target word pairs one-by-one that 
were controlled for imagability, concreteness, length and frequency via the use of a 
psycholinguistic database. Secondly, participants were presented with the first word 
of every word pair and were asked to enter how likely they would be able to recall 
each missing target word on a 0 to 100 scale where 100 equalled being certain to 
recall the target word and 0 being uncertain, this was blocked into two blocks of 50 
trials. Thirdly, participants were presented with the cue word of each cue-target word 
pair and were instructed to enter the target word if able; this also consisted of two 50 
block trials. Fourthly, participants then completed a FOK judgement and a four-
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alternative-choice task that was a part of another thesis. During JOL estimation and 
recall, after 50 trials had been completed a screen would appear that would instruct 
participants to have a break. This screen contained a picture that was dependent on 
the condition. Controls viewed a beach scene and cravers viewed a cup of coffee. 
These images were used to control for any craving dissipation that may have 
occurred quickly after the induction task (Kemp, Tiggemann, & Grigg, 2008; Kemp, 
Tiggemann, 2009a; 2009b; Madden & Zwann, 2001; Zwaan, Stanfield, & Madden, 
2000; Zwaan & Truitt, 1998).   
Control manipulation. Those in the control group completed an imagery 
and exposure task at two points within the experiment. Controls were instructed to 
pour a glass of water from a jug before being read an imagery-based paragraph. An 
orange based air freshener was also sprayed in the room prior to them entering.  
Controls were read a paragraph that was adapted from Baylen, (2007) on smoking 
cravings (see Appendix H) which instructed participants to imagine being on their 
favourite holiday and to imagine the associated smells and sounds regarding that 
experience. This task was completed after participants encoded the 100 word pairs 
and again after they had attempted to recall all 100 target words. A holiday was used 
as it is not a substance which may have influenced coffee craving ratings. The use of 
a holiday has also been used as a control manipulation in previous research as it does 
not induce a craving but is desirable (Green, Rogers, & Elliman, 2000). 
Craving manipulation. Those in the craving group were given an alternative 
imagery and exposure task at two points within the experiment. Cravers were 
instructed to view and pour a cup of freshly brewed coffee from a plunger before 
being read an imagery-based paragraph. Cravers were read a paragraph that was also 
adapted from Baylen, (2007) (see Appendix I) on smoking cravings which instructed 
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participants to imagine consuming a cup of their favourite coffee at that moment and 
to imagine smells associated with consuming that coffee (Tiggemann & Kemps, 
2005). This task was completed after participants encoded the 100 word-pairs and 
again after they had attempted to recall all 100 target words.  
Post-experimental measures. A retrospective VAS (see Appendix J) similar 
to the one used by Kemps, Tiggemann, and Grigg, (2008) measuring levels of 
craving was used to measure cravings for four time-points: (1) when the participant 
arrived at the experiment; (2) at the completion of the first imagery and exposure 
task; (3) at the completion of the second imagery and exposure tasks and; (4) at the 
end of the experiment. The reason for using a retrospective VAS was that we did not 
want to possibly induce cravings in the control group and those in the craving group 
may have reported inaccurate ratings due to knowing that cravings were being 
evaluated (Kemps, Tiggemann, & Grigg, 2008). Participants then completed a trait 
caffeine craving questionnaire in the form of an Attitude to Caffeine Questionnaire 
(ACQ) which was adapted from a trait scale looking at chocolate (Benton, 
Greenfield, & Morgan, 1998). Participants also completed a Caffeine Dependence 
Questionnaire (CDQ; adapted from Raistrick et al., 1994). These two questionnaires 
were used to obtain a baseline measure of participant’s attitudes to caffeine and 
assess possible caffeine dependence (see Appendices K & L). Participants also 
received a debrief form (see Appendix M). Words used can be found in Appendix P. 
Results 
Data Screening  
 Within the descriptive data there were four instances where data was missing, 
these instances were left blank. Answers that were inputted during testing and were 
outside the possible value ranges were identified and moderated by the 
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experimenters. The process was used to control for data entry and spelling errors. If 
an error could not be corrected with confidence it was deleted and recorded (see 
Appendix N). Z-scores were calculated for VAS time-points and JOL accuracy 
coefficients which identified one value having a z-score larger than 3.29 which may 
have indicated an outlier in the craving group. According to Tabachnick and Fidell, 
(1996) the probability of sampling a score that high was 0.001, and as such analyses 
were conducted on JOL calibration including and excluding the outlying score to see 
its influence on the results. JOL calibration excluding the z-score was non-
significant, t(64) = -1.67, p = .10, 95%CI [-.05, .00], d = 0.42. Due to the small 
change in the results the outlier was retained. Inspection of histograms indicated that 
on average data was normally distributed (see Appendix O). 
Descriptive information 
 The following information was used to determine if differences other than 
those due to the craving manipulation had occurred, possibly influencing how the 
results were interpreted. There was no significant difference in terms of sex between 
controls and cravers, t(65) = .014, p = .989, d = 0.003. There was no significant 
difference in age between the control (M = 26.34; SD = 8.18) and the craving group 
(M = 31.30, SD = 13.83), t(55.9) = -1.80, p = .078, d = 0.48. There was also no 
significant difference in the number of coffee servings per day between controls (M 
= 1.97; SD = 1.03) and cravers (M = 2.06; SD = .97), t(65) = -.36, p = .719, d = 
0.089. Reports of caffeine intake in the 24 hours before the experiment did not 
significantly differ between controls (M = .56; SD = .50) and cravers (M = .38; SD = 
.49), t(65) = 1.47, p = .147, d = 0.36. There was a significant difference in the 
amount of hours since coffee was consumed by participants, with cravers (M = 
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12.09; SD = 2.75) abstaining significantly longer than controls (M = 4.69; SD = 
4.87), t(47.9) = -7.56, p <.001, d = 2.18, see Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1. Mean number of hours since coffee was last consumed by controls and 
cravers.  
There was also a significant difference in 1st year psychology undergraduate 
status between controls and cravers although 50.7% of the sample was incorrectly 
coded. There was no significant difference in self-report ratings between controls (M 
= 6.44; SD = 1.05) and cravers (M = 6.34; SD = .84), in terms of liking the taste of 
coffee, t(65) = .41, p = .683, d = 0.10. This indicates that the craving manipulation 
was successful and differences outside of those attributed to the manipulation were 
not found, increasing the utility of the following results.   
Craving manipulation  
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 A 2(condition: control, craving) x 4(VAS time-point: on arrival, end of first 
craving induction, end of second craving induction and end of study) mixed factorial 
ANOVA was utilised to determine craving strength levels measured by the VAS for 
each of the four time-points. Mauchly's Test of Sphericity indicated that the 
assumption of sphericity had been violated, χ2(5) = 20.08, p = .001 resulting in the 
use of a Greenhouse-Geisser epsilon correction (ε = .853). Levene’s test of 
homogeneity of variance was significant in regards to the second exposure task 
resulting in the ANOVA being interpreted with some caution. The ANOVA revealed 
a significant main effect of condition, in which cravers (M = 76.27; SD = 3.94; 
95%CI [68.41, 84.14]) reported on average significantly higher craving ratings 
across all four time points compared to controls (M = 36.74; SD = 4.12; 95%CI 
[28.52, 44.97]), F(1, 65) = 48.11, p <.001, ηp2 = .425, see Figure 2. 
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Figure 2. Mean craving strength ratings retrospectively reported via the VAS for 
controls and cravers.  
 The ANOVA also revealed a significant main effect of time-point in which, 
irrespective of condition coffee cravings increased linearly across all four time-
points, F(2.56, 166.33) = 19.16, p <.001, ηp2 = .23, following a Greenhouse-Geisser 
correction (ε = .853), see Figure 2. The Condition x Time-point interaction trended 
towards significance although it was non-significant, F(2.56, 166.33) = 2.59, p = 
.064, ηp2 = .038, following a Greenhouse-Geisser correction (ε = .853). Inspecting 
Figure 2 it would appear that this interaction may indicate greater craving strength 
differences at the end of both induction tasks compared to the first and last time-
points. 
Recall Performance 
 It is important to differentiate two types of recall, namely quantity-based and 
accuracy-based recall. Quantity measures are input bound and usually test the 
quantity of information that can be recalled (Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996). Quantity 
measures assess the likelihood that every item is recalled (Koriat & Goldsmith, 
1996). Accuracy measures examine the extent in which recalled information can be 
trusted by an individual as being correct (Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996). As participants 
were able to withhold from answering an item an element of metacognitive control 
was introduced (Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996). As such recall performance was tested 
in two different ways: (1) recall accuracy was assessed across all trials, which 
assessed the quantity of information provided and; (2) recall accuracy was assessed 
by assessing the accuracy only of responses that were volunteered by the participant.  
An independent-samples t-test compared controls and cravers total recall 
accuracy across all trials (quantity). Controls (M = .20; SD = .21) accurately recalled 
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significantly more words than controls (M = .09; SD = .12) on average, t(49.26) = 
2.56, p = .014, 95%CI [.02, .19], d = .72, see Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3. Mean recall accuracy in decimal for all responses for controls and cravers. 
 An independent-samples t-test compared controls’ and cravers’ recall 
accuracy only on trials where a word was volunteered by a participant (accuracy). 
There was no significant difference in how many words were accurately recalled 
between controls (M = .58; SD = .27) and cravers (M = .44; SD = .29), t(65) = 1.98, p 
= .052, 95%CI [.00, .27], d = .49, see Figure 4. 
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Figure 4. Mean recall accuracy in decimal only for responses that were volunteered 
by controls and cravers. 
 Although a borderline moderate effect size was identified, these results 
indicate that cravers appeared to have suffered from the craving manipulation in their 
ability to accurately recall target words compared to controls. While the results 
indicate that the quantity of information provided was reduced for cravers the effect 
size for only volunteered responses may provide tentative evidence that the accuracy 
of volunteered information may have been encumbered in cravers due to the craving 
manipulation.  
JOL accuracy  
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 JOL accuracy was calculated by comparing participants’ JOLs to their 
subsequent word recall performance. JOL accuracy uses three main measures to 
understand the extent in which JOLs are predictive of future recall performance 
accuracy. These three measures are: (1) calibration, expressed as ‘C’; (2) Over/under 
confidence, expressed as ‘O/U’ and; (3) resolution, expressed as ‘ANRI’.    
Calibration. Calibration surrounds how well JOLs correspond to future recall 
performance accuracy. For ‘perfect’ calibration participants would need to provide 
JOLs of 70%, and following that recall performance accuracy should be around 70%. 
To determine calibration a statistic commonly referred to as ‘C’ is used, this statistic 
functions on a 0 – 1 range with 0 meaning perfect calibration and 1 meaning non-
existent calibration. ‘C’ is calculated using the formula below and conceptually 
relates to how realistic JOLs are in terms of subsequent recall performance (Brewer 
& Wells, 2006). 
 
While the ‘C’ statistic has its utility, the use of a calibration curve enables the 
confidence-recall relationship to be inspected visually. Visual inspection allows 
conditions to be compared against a linear line representing perfect calibration while 
also enabling over or under confidence to be readily identified (Palmer, Brewer, 
Weber, & Nagesh, 2013). See Figure 5 as it provides an example with only the 
perfect calibration line. 
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Figure 5. An example of a calibration plot with the perforated line of perfect 
calibration present only. 
Figure 6 shows the JOL calibration curves for both controls and cravers. It 
appears that there is considerable overconfidence for both conditions with cravers 
appearing to suffer from overconfidence more so. The presence of a floor effect for 
cravers indicates that the JOLs made with less than 60% confidence resulted in 
accuracy levels of around 5%. In terms of ‘perfect’ calibration controls appear to be 
closer to that line compared to cravers indicating better calibration. For JOLs made 
with 75% ratings or more accuracy can be seen as readily increasing although at 
every JOL rating controls appear to be better calibrated and have higher recall 
accuracy.  
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Figure 6. Calibration curve plotting JOL against the percentage of words accurately 
recalled for controls and cravers.  
An independent-samples t-test compared controls’ and cravers’ level of 
correspondence between JOL ratings and overall recall accuracy. There was no 
significant difference in correspondence between JOL ratings and overall accuracy 
between controls (M = .04; SD = .05) and cravers (M = .06; SD = .06), t(65) = -1.94, 
p = .056, 95%CI [-.05, .00], d = .48. This indicated that JOLs were equally as 
realistic for controls cravers 
Over/Under confidence. O/U averages the amount of over or under confidence 
across all trials. For overconfidence to occur one’s average JOL would need to be 
higher than their overall recall accuracy. For under confidence to occur one’s 
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average confidence would need to be lower than their overall recall accuracy. Like 
calibration O/U functions via a range, namely -1 to 1. Within this range -1 equates to 
total under confidence (100% recall accuracy, with 0% confidence) and 1 equates to 
total over confidence (0% recall accuracy, with 100% confidence). Algebraically, 
O/U is calculated via the function:  where  equals one’s mean level of 
confidence and  equalling one’s mean recall accuracy (Yang, Thompson, & Bland, 
2012).   
 An independent-samples t-test compared controls’ and cravers’ level of O/U 
in terms of their overall recall accuracy. There was no significant difference in O/U 
between controls (M = .07; SD = .11) and cravers (M = .11; SD = .13), t(65) = -1.33, 
p = .187, 95%CI [-.10, .02], d = 0.33. While inspection of Figure 6 appeared to show 
a clear difference in the level of overconfidence between controls and cravers, these 
results indicate that this difference is non-significant.  
Resolution. Resolution corresponds to how able JOLs are at predicting 
subsequent recall accuracy (Yaniv, Yates, & Smith, 1991). Like calibration and O/U 
resolution utilises a coefficient in the form of the Adjusted Normalised Resolution 
Index (ANRI) statistic. This statistic functions via a numerical range of 0-1 where 0 
equates to a complete inability for one to predict subsequent recall accuracy using 
one’s knowledge of confidence and 1 equating to a perfect ability for one to predict 
subsequent recall accuracy using one’s knowledge of confidence (Sauer, Weber, & 
Brewer, 2012). ANRI is calculated using the formula below and reflects the extent to 
which correct responses receive higher JOL ratings (Brewer & Wells, 2006): 
𝐴𝑁𝑅𝐼 =
(𝑛 ([
1
𝑛 
∑ 𝑛𝑗
𝐽
𝑗=1 (𝑎𝑗 − 𝑎)
2
] ÷ 𝑎(1 − 𝑎)) − 𝑗 + 1)
𝑛 − 𝑗 + 1
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 An independent-samples t-test compared controls’ and cravers’ resolution via 
ANRI. There was no significant difference in the extent to which correct responses 
received higher JOL ratings between controls (M = .57; SD = .27) and cravers (M = 
.54; SD = .28), t(62) = .36, p = .719, 95%CI [-.11, .16], d = 0.09. This result 
alongside the results of calibration and O/U appear to indicate that coffee cravings 
statistically did not influence JOL accuracy. One caveat to this is the effect size for 
calibration which was bordering on moderate. By looking at the calibration curve it 
appears that this task was quite difficult especially when JOL ratings were below 
chance. Due to the floor effect one may argue that the reason for near significance in 
terms of calibration is due to a significant difference in O/U. A conservative 
approach would be to re-run the analyses for calibration, O/U and resolution 
removing JOL estimates that were below chance. This would allow greater precision 
in determining any influence of the craving manipulation upon JOL accuracy.  
Calibration (50% JOLs or above). Calibration was reanalysed using only 
JOLs of 50% and over. An independent-samples t-test on the updated calibration 
data resulted in a significant difference between JOLs and overall accuracy with 
controls (M = .12; SD = .12) being significantly better calibrated compared to cravers 
(M = .19; SD = .15), t(65) = -2.09, p = .021, 95%CI [-.14, .00], d = 0.52. This 
indicated that JOLs were more realistic for those in the control group compared to 
cravers (see Figure 7.).  
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Figure 7. Calibration curve plotting JOL confidence greater than 50% against the 
percentage of words accurately recalled for controls and cravers.  
 O/U (50% JOLs or above). An independent samples t-test compared 
controls and cravers level of O/U in terms of their overall accuracy. There was no 
significant difference in O/U between controls (M = .20; SD = .20) and cravers (M = 
.31; SD = .26), t(65) = -1.90, p = .062, 95%CI [-.22, .01], d = 0.47.  
 Resolution (50% JOLs or above). An independent-samples t-test compared 
controls and cravers resolution via ANRI. There was no significant difference in the 
extent to which correct responses received higher JOL ratings between controls (M = 
.40; SD = .36) and cravers (M = .34; SD = .35), t(57) = .61, p = .543, 95%CI [-.13, 
.24], d = 0.16. 
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Discussion 
 Three outcomes were derived from the current study, two of which were 
clear and were expected and one that may require further investigation. The current 
study successfully induced coffee cravings via the use of enforced abstinence, in 
vivo exposure and imagery, which adds support to the notion that cravings, 
specifically coffee cravings, can be induced in an experimental context and 
supporting the first hypothesis (Kemps & Tiggemann, 2009a; 2009b; Tiggemann, 
Kemps, & Parnell, 2010). Secondly, controls accurately recalled significantly more 
words than cravers when the criterion included all responses (i.e. blank responses) on 
the word pair memory task (Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996). This, with the success of the 
craving manipulation indicates that cravings impaired cognitive performance 
supporting the second hypothesis as well as adding support to previous research. 
Finally, JOL calibration indicated that controls were significantly better calibrated 
than cravers. This final result indicates that the craving manipulation may have 
affected JOL accuracy in terms of calibration and adds tentative support to the theory 
that cravings may influence metacognitive accuracy.  
Recall accuracy 
 The same principles highlighted by Koriat and Goldsmith, (1996) were 
employed in the current study to determine if quantity and accuracy based measures 
differed. When comparing total recall accuracy (quantity based) controls accurately 
recalled significantly more words than cravers. When comparing recall accuracy of 
only volunteered responses (accuracy based) no significant difference was found 
between controls and cravers, although a moderate effect size was found. The results 
appear to provide evidence that cravers suffered reduced performance in a cognitive 
task – in this case recall due to resources being allocated to the presence of cravings. 
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This result matches those of previous studies looking at cognitive resource utilisation 
when completing a basic cognitive task in the presence of induced cravings (Kemps, 
Tiggemann, & Grigg, 2008; Kemps & Tiggemann, 2009a; 2009b).  
Did cravings influence JOL accuracy? 
 The results of the first calibration analysis indicated no significant difference 
in how realistic JOLs were between controls and cravers. In both conditions 
overconfidence was present (i.e. participants thought they would accurately recall 
more words than what they actually did) with cravers appearing to have higher 
overconfidence compared to controls based on visual inspection of the calibration 
curves. However, the results of the first O/U analysis indicated no significant 
difference between controls and cravers in terms of either over or under confidence. 
Within the current study considerable overconfidence was found for both 
cravers and controls indicating that task difficulty may have been quite high which 
may help to explain the low accuracy rates in comparison to JOLs (i.e. calibration) 
(Son & Metcalfe, 2005). The presence of overconfidence in comparison to low 
accuracy may also be attributed to the way in which mnemonic cues were formed 
and under what conditions (Koriat, 1997). While calibration was non-significant in 
the first analysis, the presence of a moderate effect size indicated that craver’s 
mnemonic cues may have been influenced by cravings resulting in poor accuracy 
and calibration. This could be due to mnemonic cues functioning beneath 
consciousness (Koriat, 2007). Interestingly there was also a considerable floor effect 
for cravers in that until around 60% confidence the percentage of words recalled 
accurately was around 5%. Due to the presence of a floor effect within the craving 
condition and no significant difference between controls and cravers in terms of over 
or under confidence a second calibration analysis was conducted. 
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The resolution results (i.e., extent to which correct responses receive higher 
JOL ratings) indicated that there was no significant difference between controls and 
cravers in their ability to discriminate between items that would and would not be 
recalled in a later test. ANRI values for both groups were average indicating some 
ability in using JOLs to predict performance, but no effect of craving on resolution. 
Thus it would appear that both groups’ resolution was average indicating that 
cravers’ mnemonic cues may have been largely unaffected by cravings. 
The second calibration analysis indicated a significant difference in that 
controls were significantly better calibrated compared to cravers (i.e. the correlation 
between JOLs and predictive accuracy was significantly higher for controls than 
what it was for cravers). Once the floor effect was removed from the calibration 
curve it appeared that the difference in calibration may have been due to an apparent 
difference in O/U. This resulted in O/U being reanalysed using JOLs that were above 
chance level. The re-analysis of O/U indicated no significant difference, although a 
borderline effect size was found for O/U so it should not be discounted that cravers 
may have been more overconfident compared to controls. The second resolution 
analysis using the same exclusion criteria as the reanalysis for calibration and O/U 
was non-significant, although, the mean resolution dropped from .54 to .34 for 
cravers when only JOLs of 50% or more were used. This may indicate that cravings 
reduced the utility of mnemonic cues in terms of resolution i.e., when JOLs of 50% 
or more are used it would be expected that resolution would be higher compared to 
when all JOL ratings are used (Brewer & Wells, 2006). These results suggest that 
when participants make JOLs that are around chance level those who may be craving 
appear to be less well calibrated compared to controls although this difference may 
be in some way explained by the difference in overconfidence.  
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What does this all mean? 
The pattern of current findings indicate that the impairment in cognition due 
to cravings resulted in a significant decrease in JOL calibration for cravers and a near 
significant difference in O/U where cravers appeared to be more overconfident 
compared to controls. Two possible outcomes from these results can be drawn. 
Firstly, that the metacognitive processes of JOLs appears to be largely 
automatic and heuristically driven as craving participants were unable to moderate 
their JOLs due to the presence of another cognitive task requiring resources -  
reducing the likelihood of accurate target recall. This indicates that cravings may 
subvert the predictive utility and subsequent accuracy of JOLs in terms of recall 
accuracy (Koriat, 1997; 2007). This is important due to the supposed automatic 
nature of JOLs in that people may not be aware that cravings may be reducing the 
predictive utility of JOLs, possibly leading to serious consequences in terms judging 
one’s own learning (Dunlosky & Metcalfe, 2009).  
 Secondly, it could be argued that due to JOLs being effected by the depletion 
in cognitive resources JOLs may be more deliberative than previously considered 
(Koriat, 1997). As JOLs appeared to be affected it may suggest that there is 
analytical component as JOLs may have been sensitive to the reduction in available 
resources, compared to if JOLs were purely heuristically driven and automatic. If 
JOLs are purely automatic and have such little analytical processing one may assume 
that JOLs would then be immune to the reduction in resources, i.e., cravings 
wouldn’t influence JOLs as they may be immune from the dearth of resources. 
Applying the results to theory 
 Koriat’s (1997) cue-utilisation theory suggests that participants utilise cues 
when making JOLs and the accuracy of JOLs then depends on the correlation 
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between intrinsic, extrinsic and mnemonic cues used and the criteria of any 
subsequent memory test. If the assumption that delayed JOLs have an increased 
reliance on mnemonic cues is true, then it would appear that Koriat’s (1997) 
experienced-based monitoring paradigm may be better suited in explaining delayed 
JOLs operation. Findings from the current study appear to support this idea in that 
cravers may have utilised these heuristics although the effect of craving may have 
reduced their utility.  
Interestingly, Koriat (1993) suggested that the subjective instance of 
intuition, in terms of feeling that one knows the answer (which requires conscious 
awareness) is actually the end product which is the summation of processes or 
heuristics that operate beneath one’s conscious awareness. This approach may 
explain why JOL calibration was significantly lower for cravers compared to 
controls; conscious awareness was not paid to the influence of cravings when 
making JOLs due to heuristics informing mnemonic cues operating beneath 
consciousness (Koriat, 2007; Metcalfe & Finn, 2008; Son & Metcalfe, 2005).  
Research indicates that JOLs are permeable to the ease in which information 
is processed and that JOLs reflect the likelihood of future recall, but also other 
factors like the difficulty in which to-be-remembered words are retrieved during the 
learning process (Begg, Duft, Lalonde, Melnick, & Sanvito, 1989; Benjamin, Bjork, 
and Schwartz, 1998; Koriat, 1997; 2007). As these factors are suggested to function 
beneath one’s conscious awareness it is plausible that they permeated JOLs – the 
question then becomes whether the cues were accurate (not effected by cravings) or 
inaccurate (effected by cravings). But this distinction may not be so straightforward 
in that cues that were affected by cravings which affected future recall performance 
may actually have been accurate in the end. One solution may be to inspect the 
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response times to determine how quickly items were encoded and retrieved which 
may help elucidate cue accuracy in terms of JOLs (Metcalfe & Finn, 2008; Son and 
Metcalfe, 2005).  
 What does this mean in terms of cravings? In terms of calibration including 
only JOLs greater than 50%, controls were significantly more realistic compared to 
cravers in their JOL accuracy (ability to successfully judge the likelihood of target 
recall). One explanation for this finding surrounds how mnemonic cues function in 
terms of resource utilisation. Craving literature suggests that regions synonymous 
with working memory and cognitive control are heavily utilised in the presence of 
cravings and that cravings in general shift cognitive resources to attending to that 
craving (Englemann, 2012; Tiffany, 1990; 1995). The question then becomes, can 
mnemonic cues, such as encoding fluency and information retrieval be permeable to 
cravings resulting in an inaccurate metacognitive judgement?  
The calibration evidence indicates that participants in the craving condition 
may have indirectly suffered from encoding fluency and/or information retrieval 
issues due to the presence of cravings thus leading to reduced calibration (Metcalfe 
& Finn, 2008; Son & Metcalfe, 2005). This explanation does have some credence 
following Koriat’s (1997) experience-based paradigm as the mnemonic cues are 
suggested to function beneath one’s consciousness, this may explain why cravers 
were overconfident in their ability but subsequently recalled significantly less words 
compared to controls i.e., they may have been unaware of the impact upon these 
cues(Metcalfe & Finn, 2008; Koriat, 1993; 1997; 2006). Evidence for this suggestion 
can also be seen in the levels of overconfidence, while not being statistically 
significant the borderline effect size indicates cravers exhibited greater 
overconfidence.  
39 
 
 
 
Due to mnemonic cues influencing metacognitive judgements JOLs may 
have been overstated in the craving condition (Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996). Cravers 
may not have been aware that mnemonic cues such as processing fluency and 
retrieval ability may have been negatively affected due to cognitive resources being 
utilised by the presence of cravings (Zuj, Palmer, & Kemps, 2015). This may explain 
why cravers were so poor in terms of calibration compared to controls.  
Limitations 
  The use of imagery and in vivo exposure was combined in the current study 
due to the associated strength in combining both visual and imagery methods of 
craving (Kemps & Tiggemann, 2009a; 2009b; Tiffany, Carter, & Singleton, 2000). 
Due to this combination we were unable to ascertain if one method was stronger in 
its ability to induce cravings. The current study also did not utilise a baseline 
measure of imagery ability which was used by Kemps & Tiggemann, (2009a; 
2009b). Future studies would be advised to incorporate a baseline imagery ability 
measure to control for participants low on imagery.  
In terms of caffeine, research has proposed that the half-life of caffeine may 
be as much as doubled in women who consume oral contraceptive and as little as 
half in smokers (Kalow, 1985). If participants were smokers they may have entered 
caffeine withdrawal, invalidating the measure of coffee craving as they may have 
been craving the secondary effects of coffee i.e., caffeine (Juliano & Griffiths, 2004). 
Screening for smoking status or oral contraceptive use may have resulted in greater 
confidence that coffee craving was being measured compared to symptoms of 
withdrawal.  
Summary 
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 In conclusion, a successful craving induction resulted in significantly higher 
craving ratings across four time points compared to controls. In turn, craving 
participants accurately recalled significantly less words compared to controls. There 
was no significant difference between cravers and controls in terms of over or under 
confidence, resolution or calibration although a moderate effect size was found for 
calibration. Due to the resulting effect size and an identified floor effect in terms of 
cravers’ accuracy a conservative approach was taken which compared calibration 
between controls and cravers when JOL ratings were at chance level or above. This 
resulted in controls being significantly better calibrated to cravers.  
In terms of the experience-based paradigm this result suggests mnemonic 
cues such as encoding fluency and information retrieval ability may require 
cognitive resources as intrinsic and extrinsic cues were largely controlled (i.e., word 
pairs were unrelated and presented only once) although encoding was self-paced. 
Due to the fact that these mnemonic cues function beneath consciousness 
participants experiencing cravings may have used these cues unbeknownst that the 
mnemonic cues may have been violated by the presence of cravings reducing their 
utility in JOL formation. Determining whether JOLs are automatic or deliberative 
cannot be answered with confidence within this study, although arguments for both 
are made. 
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Appendix H 
Verbalised Imagery Task for Controls 
I want you to walk up to the table and to pick up the jug of water and pour yourself a 
cup. Now proceed to hold the cup as you normally would. As you do this, focus on 
your favourite holiday [PAUSE].  
 
Imagine what it would be like to be on this holiday right at this moment. Keep 
imagining this until I speak again [PAUSE]. 
 
Now pay attention to the smells and sounds of the holiday [PAUSE]. Imagine again 
what it would be like to be on your favourite holiday right at this moment. Pay 
attention to the sounds you would hear on this holiday [PAUSE]. Keep focusing on 
the sights and sounds of holiday until I speak again.  
 
Now stand with your cup of water and walk over to the table where you poured 
yourself a cup and place your cup on that same table. As you do so, imagine for the 
last time, what it would be like to be on your favourite holiday [PAUSE]. 
 
You have now completed this part of the experiment. 
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Appendix I 
Verbalised Imagery Task for Cravers 
On the table, you will see a hot jug of freshly made coffee and an empty white mug. 
Take a moment to look at these objects [PAUSE]. 
 
Now, I want you to walk up to the table and to pick up the jug of freshly made coffee 
and pour yourself a cup and to pay attention to the sound of the coffee being poured 
into the cup. Now proceed to hold the cup of coffee as you normally would. As you 
do this, focus on the weight in the cup now that it is full [PAUSE]. Imagine what it 
would be like to drink a cup of your favourite coffee right at this moment. Keep 
imagining this until I speak again. [PAUSE]  
 
Now sit down in the chair with your cup of coffee and pay attention to the smell of 
the coffee and the colour and imagine again what it would be like to have a cup of 
your favourite coffee right at this moment [PAUSE]. Pay attention to any steam as it 
slowly curls and rises above the cup. Keep focussing on the sight and smell of the 
cup of coffee until I speak again.  
 
Now stand with your cup of coffee and walk over to the table where you poured 
yourself a cup and place your cup on that same table. As you do so, imagine for the 
last time, what it would be like to drink a cup of your favourite coffee. [PAUSE] 
 
You have now completed this component of the project.  
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Appendix J 
Retrospective Visual Analogue Scale measuring craving strength 
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Appendix K 
Attitudes to Caffeine Questionnaire (ACQ) 
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Appendix L 
Caffeine Dependence Questionnaire (CDQ) 
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Appendix M 
Debrief form 
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Appendix N 
Input Modifications 
Please see the associated zip file or the attached CD to view the word 
document that contains the modified changes that were moderated by two 
researchers. 
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Appendix O 
SPSS Data 
Please see the associated zip file or the attached CD to view the SPSS data 
output for analysis one and analysis two.  
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Appendix P 
Words used 
Please see the associated zip file or the attached CD to view the list of word 
pairs used within this study. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
